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Social Security Taxes
THE SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES include the general old age an-
nuity and unemployment insurance taxes as well as the spe-
cial taxes laid with respect to railroad employment. For old
age annuities employers and workers each pay ipercent on
wages. The employer makes both payments, deducting the
worker's share from his wages. According to present legisla-
tion, the rate paid by each will be advanced to 2 per cent on
January 1,1943, andby the beginning of 1949willreach a
maximum of 3 per cent.
The unemployment insurance tax, paid by employers alone,
is 8 per cent of wage payments. The combined levy on pay-
rolls, now 2 per cent for old age annuities and 3 per cent for
unemployment insurance, or a total of 5 per cent, will be 9
per cent by 1949, 6 per cent for old age pensions and 3 per
cent for unemployment insurance.' These taxes apply to most
wage payments of $3,ooo or less. The chief exceptions are the
wages of governmental and railroad employees, agricultural
and casual laborers, workers in nonprofit organizations of a
religious, charitable, educational, literary, or scientific char-
acter, and in domestic service; but the exceptions differ some-
what for the two taxes.
The wages of railroad employees up to $300 a month are
taxed 3 per cent to both the employees and the railroad in
order to provide the former with an annuity on retirement.
The railroad deducts the employee's share from his wages and
remits it to the Railroad Retirement Board. Ten per cent of
the revenue is deposited in a special fund earmarked for the
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expenses of administering unemployment insurance benefits.
So much of the remaining 90 per cent as is not required for
current needs is deposited in an unemployment insurance
account with the Treasury. These funds are invested by the
Secretary of the Treasury, under the direction of the Rail-
road Retirement Board, in federal bonds yielding not less
than 3 per cent. Under the present law the rates of these taxes
will, after several advances, be stabilized at percent at
the beginning of 1949. The railroad, but not the employee,
also pays a tax of 3 per cent on the same basis to provide
unemployment insurance. This combined rate of 9 per cent
laid on railroad payrolls will eventually be 10½ per cent.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue collects the general old
age annuity and unemployment insurance taxes as well as the
railroad retirement taxes. The proceeds from the old age
annuity tax are deposited in the Federal Old Age and Sur-
vivors Trust Fund. Money not needed for current payments
is invested by the Secretary of the Treasury, trustee of the
Fund, in federal obligations.
Since the federal government allows credits up to go per
cent of its own unemployment insurance tax for taxes paid
under approved state unemployment insurance plans, the
taxes actually collected in this field are mainly those levied
by the states. The unemployment insurance taxes collected
by the states are deposited in the Unemployment Trust Fund
of the Treasury, which keeps an account with each state, and
invests any money not withdrawn for current payments in
federal obligations. Because of the credit (90 per cent of the
tax levied under federal law) for state unemployment insur-
ance taxes paid, the federal unemployment insurance tax
yields a relatively small annual revenue to the Treasury.
From this amount, grants are made to the states to meet the
cost of administering unemployment insurance programs.
Collections from all the social security levies are deposited
in trust funds held by the Treasury. Accordingly, social se-
curity tax revenues which are not needed to finance currentSOCIAL SECURITY TAXES 307
obligations incurred under the accompanying program of aid
to workers are made available for the general purposes of
government through loans to the Treasury by the trustee of
the Fund. Since the old age annuity program has not yet
reached maturity the currently collected taxes exceed the
benefits paid. The railroad retirement program alone pays
benefits equal to or greater than the taxes collected. The un-
employment insurance program, started as it was in the midst
of the great depression, has thus far experienced a net excess
of receipts over disbursements, despite a liberalization of
benefit provisions in some states, because' of declining unem-
ployment, higher wages, and the growth in number of
workers covered.
In the fiscal year 1941 the Federal Old Age and Survivors
Trust Fund was credited with deposits of $688.i million, from
the old age annuity tax and $56 million interest, or a total
of $744.1 million; expenditures were $91.2 million. The
Railroad Retirement account received $i 16.1 million and ex-
pended $121.2 million; and the Unemployment Trust Fund,
in which both the state and the railroad unemployment re-
serves are kept, received deposits of $1,009.9 million and
expended million. Deposits in all these trust funds
exceeded expenditures by $1,236.3 million.2 As the war econ-
omy becomes more active, more workers will be employed,
and wage payments will increase, because of both greater
aggregate working time and higher wage rates. During the
next few years the excess of social security tax collections over
expenditures is likely to increase. And, as has been observed,
the entire excess, beyond cash reserves, goes to the Treasury
in exchange for its obligations.
1 ADDITIONAL USE OF SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES IN WAR FINANCE
The need for absorbing general spending power, and doing
so promptly as income expands, leads naturally to the sug-
gestion that additional use be made of social security taxes in
the present situation. Taxes on wages absorb funds which308 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
would otherwise be spent for civilian goods generally. Also
they have the advantage that they are collected promptly.
The money paid to the government, being deducted from
wage payments by the employer, never gets into the possession
of the taxpayer, who has, therefore, no opportunity to spend it.
That the revenue possibilities of such a proposal are large
may be seen from the yield of the old age annuity tax, $690.5
million in the fiscal year. 1941 when levied at a combined rate
of 2 per cent. Its yield in the fiscal 1942 is estimated at
about $900 million. Doubling the rate would probably double
the revenue. A rate of 5 per cent, which would be below the
corresponding tax on railroad payrolls and would not repre-
sent an extreme increase as compared with the increases in
the taxation of lower bracket incomes made by the Revenue
Act of 1941, would add more than $i,ioo million to the
present yield. If at the same time the coverage were broad-
ened significantly, the revenue would be much larger. Indeed,
it seems probable that as much as $1.5billionof additional
revenue could. be realized. Heavier taxation for unemploy-
ment insurance and related purposes would yield large addi-
tional sums for the Treasury, though chiefly in the form of
loans from trust funds held in the name of the states.3
2 FUTURE BENEFITS
But social security levies are not ordinary taxes. In effect they
are compulsory insurance premiums paid for benefits dis-
pensed when unemployment or old age and retirement comes.
The suggestion that social security taxes be used to absorb
additional spending power probably implies a corresponding
increase of future benefits to the workers whose wages would
be taxed. These additional benefits could be either of two
sorts: an increase in the types of benefit now given, that is,
larger pensions for retired workers and more liberal unem-
ployment advances; or new types of benefit.
The substantial and growing demand for enlarging the
benefits provided by the social security program takes severalSOCIAL SECURITY TAXES 309
forms. The existence of a large number of workers outside
the combined systems creates continuing pressure to broaden
the coverage, for the question why some workers are given
and others denied protection will not down. Mr. Altineyer,
Chairman of the Social Security Board, favors a wider cover-
age,4 and the President approves. Both the needs of retired
workers and the contrast between the annuities purchased by
contributions and the state pensions to needy old persons
favor larger retirement annuities. Similarly, a case can be
made for larger unemployment benefits. In most states un-
employment benefits are small and available for relatively
short periods. The inadequacy of the relief has led to a de-
mand for federalizing the system of unemployment insurance
and giving larger unemployment allowances.
We do not examine the merits of any demand that the self-
financing benefits of the social security program be extended.
To do so would be to venture into policy considerations be-
yond the field of this inquiry. But if on independent grounds
the taxes and benefits are to be enlarged, a special advantage
attaches to taking that step now. The immediate additions
to tax revenues would presumably exceed the immediate in-
creases in benefit disbursements, and hence would achieve a
net reduction in current civilian spending power.
In the present situation, however, the emphasis of some
Administration spokesmen has been on new but temporary
social security benefits which would terminate with reference
to a given time or contingency following the end of the war.
From governmental quarters has come the proposal for a
'separation' or 'dismissal' wage. This payment, the amount
of the tax with accumulated interest, would be made to the
worker on his first change of employment after the war,
thereby assisting him in transferring from armament to civil-
ian production. J. M. Keynes' proposal of a tax on wages to
be treated as a deferred payment, being taken from the worker
during the war but returned with interest on the appearance310 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
of the first postwar slump,5 has already been adopted in its
essential features in Britain.
Either method raises a fundamental question. Workers to-
gether with other persons will have to consume less, during
the war, of an ever widening variety of products. Some. of the
products, especially those made of metal, compete with the
production of armament, and some are in short supply be-
cause of lack of shipping or other obstacles. Others are neces-
sary for the health and comfort of soldiers and sailors, or for
the civilian population of Great Britain or other allies. If
prices are not to be inflated, this decline in consumption must
be accompanied by a decline in civilian spending. But, except
as it is incidental to the working of a long range plan, to hold
that workers ought to consume less and be taxed more in a
time of general scarcity need not imply that they ought to be
compensated later. The one position is inherent in the situa-
tion; it does not necessarily support the other. Why then
should not the one financial counterpart of this lessened war-
time consumption be some general tax such as the personal
income tax along lines elaborated above, for which no sub-
sequent reimbursement would be made? Keynes apparently
holds that a primary purpose of his plan is to provide a future
compensation, not feasible at present, for the current unusual
privations and extra long hours of labor.
The argument of those advocating a separation wage or
deferred payment apparently includes also in varying pro-
portions a compounding of alleged desirable gains from the
redistribution of wealth involved, and the remedying or at
least mitigation of an expected postwar depression. In one
place Keynes says, "The complete scheme now proposed
•..embodiesan advance towards economic equality greater
than any which we have made in recent times"; and in an-
other, "the system of deferment will be twice blessed; and
will do almost as much good hereafter in preventing deflation
and unemployment as it does now in preventing inflation
and the exhaustion of scarce resources." 6Weshall not dis-SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES 311
cuss the redistribution of wealth in general, or the special
claims for this method of accomplishing that end. Our con-
cern is rather with the contention that social security taxation
can be used to facilitate adjustment to a peacetime economy.
Individual workers changing from wartime to peacetime
tasks may suffer temporary loss of income that could be com-
pensated by a separation wage, or workers generally may in
a serious postwar depression need such aid as would be given
by a wage deferred from the war period. But it is not certain
that either problem will appear at the close of the war, or
that if it does, the remedies proposed are the most suitable.
The first problem is really a phase of the second, for in the
absence of a depression no general problem of transfer from
one type of employment to another arises. Conceivably, a
depression might follow hard upon the heels of the war, but
no grounds exist for translating such a possibility into an
assumption. The close of the first World War was followed
by a boom, succeeded by a sharp but short slump, then by a
renewed burst of prosperity which lasted, except for minor
slumps in 1924 and 1927, until 1930. The release of pent-up
demand for automobiles, houses, and other durable goods
was important in both the generation and the maintenance
of the boom.
If, on the other hand, a severe economic depression should
materialize with the coming of peace, payment of a deferred
or a separation wage might support the economy. These de-
vices would have the advantage of operating in direct un-
forced fashion by an arrangement well understood. Depend-
ing on the situation, however, other methods might be more
effective. For example, increased investment might bring a
better response than consumer spending. Yet the adoption of
either the deferred payment or the separation wage device
would bind the government to it and thereby impede the
adoption, if they should prove necessary, of opposite measures
to prevent a post-war inflation.7312 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
3 RELATION TO THE INCOME TAX
The possibility of enlarging the collections of the social secu-
rity system suggests a comparison with the individual income
tax. Yielding large revenues, both taxes would be effective in
absorbing incomes. But there are important differences be-
tween them and both cannot be applied severely at the same
time.
The individual income tax, as the name suggests, is laid
directly on the income of individuals. Taxable income from
all sources, less a personal exemption and credit for depend-
ents, is subject to this impost. Social security taxes are applied
specifically to wages and salaries, and are paid partly by the
worker and partly by the employer. In each instance, the levy
is on a gross basis, no deductions or personal allowances being
permitted.
Under the income tax, incomes are differentiated by size
for taxation at graduated rates. Social security taxes, on the
other hand, are laid at uniform rates, on wages and salaries
up to $3,000 a year. Consequently they are a smaller percent-
age of a large income (above $3,000) than of a small. The
income tax is a contribution to the cost of government from
which the taxpayer may expect no special benefit. From social
security taxes a fund is accumulated from which benefits to
the worker are financed. The revenue from the income tax
is delayed unless and to the extent that it is collected at the
source. The unemployment insurance and old age annuity
taxes differ with respect to currency of collection. Revenue
from the unemployment insurance tax lags—on the average,
more than half a year—far behind the wage payment on which
it is collected, though this lag could probably be reduced.
From the old age annuity tax, on the other hand, which yields
much more revenue, the revenue is current. The money de-
ducted from payrolls never even comes into the possession of
the worker, and the tax money paid by the employer does not
remain in his account long.SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES 313
The point of this comparison is, however, differences hav-
ing significance for our problem. First, since social
security taxes, viewed as a whole, yield a current revenue, the
dollars collected have less opportunity to inflate prices than
have dollars collected after some delay—longer or shorter, ac-
cording to the arrangements for collection at source—by
means of the income tax.
The second difference is in the obligation for payment:
under the individual income tax it is direct. As a person
receives income, so must he pay a tax. Only half of the old
age annuity tax is legally deductible from wages. The rest is
levied upon the employer, who must pay also the entire un-
employment insurance tax. We are aware that according to
many economists, social security taxes, irrespective of who
pays them in a legal sense, tend to be borne by the worker.8
But this result can come about only through long time adjust-
ment in wage contracts, a kind of adjustment peculiarly diffi-
cult during a war boom. If the rates of either the old age an-
nuity or the unemployment insurance tax were to be raised,
pronipt adjustment would be desirable to absorb funds espe-
cially likely to be spent promptly if they remained in the
possession of workers. The amount of any increase could,
however, be deducted in full from wages, thus removing that
difference also. With the need, set forth in Chapterof
reaching the great excess of current income above feasible
spending in the middle group of incomes, those from $1,750
to $10,000,bytaxes or public borrowing, the advantage of
such an adjustment of these burdens is apparent; for these
taxes would clearly reach the incomes in at least the lower
portion of that group. Moreover, the amount not shifted to
the worker would reduce the civilian spending power in the
possession of the employer.
The third difference is in the after effects of these taxes.
The income tax gives the taxpayer no claim on the govern-
ment. Social security taxes, on the other hand, leave the gov-
ernment with an obligation to distribute future benefits.°314 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
Where, as in the instance of the old age annuity and unem-
ployment insurance taxes, increased benefits are to be ex-
pected anyhow in the not distant future, their provision at
present is to be welcomed, if accompanied by a corresponding
advance in rates of taxation. In such a situation, the mere fact
that the addition to present revenues entails an equivalent
outgo in the form of future payments cannot be counted
against social security taxes as a method of absorbing pur-
chasing power. But when social security taxes involve a com-
mitment not otherwise expected either to a permanent sched-
ule of benefits or to a temporary postwar settlement, the
income tax has the advantage that the government is left
without obligation at the close of the war and accordingly
is free to implement any financial policies which seem appro-
priate in the postwar circumstances.
As between more use of social security taxation as qualified
in the foregoing paragraph and the individual income tax,
one is not preferable to the exclusion of the other. The addi-
tional revenue that should be obtained from the taxation of
money incomes is immense, but all will not be collected.
Hence a deficiency of revenue and an excess of spending
power are accumulating, and rising prices attest the progress
of Increased revenues from taxes which reach the
incomes of wage earners constitute an essential element of
any financial program that can be expected to absorb the es-
sential amount of spending power. Whether the additional
revenue is to be derived from higher social security, taxes or
higher income taxes depends in considerable degree upon the
kinds of burden acceptable to the individuals affected. If at
least part is derived from the former, with the implication
of increased future benefits, the burden may be more tol-
erable to the workers than if higher income taxes are relied
upon for the entire additional revenue needed. The morale,
to use a much-abused term, of workers may be bolstered if
at least part of the current levy on their incomes carries with
it a promise of return in the future. In these circumstances,SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES 315
additional revenue from both types of tax, as applied to low
bracket incomes, is likely to be provided by wartime tax legis-
lation, and the sooner it can be collected, the better. Never-
theless, as noted above, drastic application of both taxes is
not practicable. Severe additions to the social security levies
would restrict the severity of possible additions to the income
taxes on low bracket incomes.
NOTES
1 Since the industrial and occupational coverage differs for the two taxes, the
wage base to which the tax applies does also.
2 This figure and supplementary data were computed from information in
the Treasury Department Bulletin, Sept. 1941,pp.6-7.
3 The proposal has been made to substitute a single federal system of unem-
ployment compensation for the separate state systems.
4HearingsRelative to the Social Security Amendments of 1939 before the
Committee on Ways and Means, 'p6th Cong., 2d Sess., I, 6i.
5 How to Pay for the War (Harcourt, Brace, 1940), p. 46.
6 Ibid., pp. 3 and 46.
7 The aid of unpublished manuscripts by Arthur W. Marget and Eugene E.
Oakes is acknowledged.
8 Not all economists would agree, but we believe that the view that places
the burden of the tax in the long run on the worker is the better opinion;
see James K. Hall, Incidence of Federal Social Security Payroll Taxes, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, Nov. 1938; also Russell Bauder, Probable Inci-
dence of Social Security Taxes, American Economic Review, Sept. 1936.
9 It is, of course, true that states finance unemployment allowances. But in
view of the treatment of the funds, this is merely a technicality.